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Abstract In this article, I take off from some central issues in Paul Katsafanas’ recent
book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics. I argue that Katsafanas’ alleged
aims of action fail to do the work he requires them to do. First, his approach to
activity or control is deeply problematic in the light of counterexamples. More
importantly, the view of activity or control he needs to get his argument going is
most likely false, as it requires our values to do work that they are too fickle to
do. Second, I take issue with the Nietzschean drive psychology underlying the
second agential aim, viz. power. I argue that ordinary desires better describe a
number of phenomena that Katsafanas uses drives to explain, and that some
actions can aim in the opposite direction. As only drive-motivated actions aim
at power, action does not, therefore, constitutively aim at power. Finally, I sketch a
Humean approach to constitutivism, and argue that it both explains the desiderata
that Katsafanas posits as well as solves the problems for his view. The Humean
view is preferable, and should be developed further.
Keywords aimsofaction .Nietzschean constitutivism .Humeanconstitutivism . reasons
for action . reasons internalism
Constitutivism – roughly, the view that normative requirements or standards are based
on the constitutive features of action or agency1 – has recently gained much ground
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among philosophers concerned with normativity and its sources. By now, many writers
have defended different versions of the view,2 and several core problems have been
discussed at both length and depth in the literature.3
Paul Katsafanas has recently developed a version of constitutivism, particularly in
his book Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism (2013).
From here and on, I refer to it as (AFE). AFE is in many ways an excellent book, but I
take issue with its main claims. Katsafanas’ case for a Nietzschean constitutivism
includes arguing that action has two constitutive aims: Activity and Power.
Constitutive aims generate criteria for success – in this case, successful action – which
are inescapable for the agent, and therefore, constitutivists think, normative.
In section (I), I describe his view in greater depth. In section (II), I first argue that
Katsafanas’ case for Activity is badly flawed. His account of Activity is false because it
fails to capture a kind of luck (that I call Reparatory Luck) and is compatible with a
severe kind of passivity in action. Moreover, Katsafanas cannot revise his view to solve
these problems, for no view which is structurally similar to Activity is likely to be
correct. This is because it relies on approval of actions in virtue of values, but values are
too fickle to serve this function. Then, in section (III), I criticize Katsafanas’ claim that
all actions aim at Power, and therefore the claim that Power is a constitutive aim of
action. I argue, first, that because interpreting actions as motivated by desires rather than
drives is less controversial and more parsimonious than adding drives, we should think
purported counterexamples do not stem from drives. Second, his response to counter-
examples where agents act to minimize or are indifferent to resistance is lacking.
But I also do something constructive. In section (IV), I sketch the outlines of a
Humean version of constitutivism and show how it can make sense of the desiderata
that Katsafanas wants his own view to make sense of. Moreover, it solves the problems
for Katsafanas’ Nietzschean view, as presented in (II) and (III). There seems, then,
to be no reason to prefer the Nietzschean version to the Humean one. At the very
least, constitutivists should prefer it to the Nietzschean view. Moreover, by
responding to Katsafanas’ desiderata as well as potentially having other support,
the Humean view has some support and seems fit for further development. So I
conclude in section (V).
(I)
As mentioned, Katsafanas thinks that Activity and Power are constitutive aims of
action. What does this mean? First, briefly, according to Katsafanas, Activity is
equilibrium; an action is active in case the agent performing it approves of it now or
would keep doing so when possessing more knowledge about its etiology. The second
aim is Power, according to which actions aim at overcoming resistance. I characterize
these aims in more depth below. The simplistic characterizations will do for now, as I
only aim to show how they fit into Katsafanas’ view.
2 Authors include Korsgaard (1996, 2009); Velleman (2009); Walden (2012); Katsafanas (2013a), Smith
(2009, 2012); Dreier (1997), and so on.
3 E.g. the agency-schmagency problem – see Enoch (2006, 2011); Velleman, op. cit., Ferrero (2009),
Katsafanas, op. cit., and Silverstein (2015), and the problem of bad action – see Lavin (2004).
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They serve, then, as constitutive aims. Katsafanas characterizes a constitutive aim as
follows:
(Constitutive Aim) Let A be a type of attitude or event. Let G be a goal. A
constitutively aims at G iff
(i) each token of A aims at G, and
(ii) aiming at G is part of what constitutes an attitude or event as a token of A.4
Here, the idea is that action – A – constitutively aims at Activity and Power. These
aims, Katsafanas thinks, satisfy both (i) and (ii). Hence, each action aims at Activity
and Power, at least to some extent, and doing so is part of constituting events as action-
tokens. Here, Constitutive Aim grounds the further claim Success:
(Success) If X aims at G, then G is a standard of success for A.5
Since action has constitutive aims, Success is inescapable insofar as we act. And it is
Activity and Power which are the standards of success for action. These generate pro
tanto reasons for action, though other pro tanto reasons are provided by an agent’s
values.
Furthermore, together, Activity and Power generate normative content, for other
values are assessed in their light. They do so by working in tandem. By Activity, an
agent can approve of his or her action (to various degrees), depending on what they
know about the action. And agents approve, or disapprove, of actions in virtue of their
values. By themselves, these values are to be assessed by Power, and ought to be
discarded either if they conflict directly with it or might lead to conflicts with it in the
future, as the other value then serves to undermine Power, either in a direct instance or
in general. Indeed, in the long run, the pro tanto reasons that stem from Power win out.
They weight other reasons in favour of the aims consistent with Power, because they
are ubiquitous, pervasive, and are (typically) reinforced by other motives.6
(II)
I take issue with Katsafanas’ aims, however. In this section, I discuss Activity, and argue
that it has three main problems. Note first that when presenting his positive account,
Katsafanas emphasizes that BActivity^ is his own term. As he says: BI will use ‘agential
activity’ as the most general term for notions that are meant to pick out the agent’s
contribution to the production of action.^7 However, BControl^ can be used instead of
this term, and indeed, I shall use the terms Activity and Control interchangeably below
4 See AFE, p. 39.
5 See ibid. However, Katsafanas qualifies this view, and claims that his version of constitutivism only requires
that if an agent aims at some goal, and endorses this aim, achieving that goal is a standard of success for the
action (pp. 208–209).
6 See ibid., pp. 39; 191–200.
7 See ibid., p. 113.
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instead of Bagential activity,^ for this enables me to say more about the phenomenon
Katsafanas is after, i.e. the agent’s own contribution or to her action.8
Katsafanas is, admittedly, somewhat vague about what he is after with Activity. He
lists a set of terms used by different authors – Bidentification, wholeheartedness,
guidance by the agent, direction by the agent, agential control, agential activity,
reflective self-control, rational control, and so forth^ 9 – without clarifying exactly
how, if at all, they hang together. It is possible that the authors he tries to unify as
discussing the same kind of thing are discussing different phenomena. However, he
adds that he uses B‘agential activity’ as the most general term for notions that are meant
to pick out the agent’s contribution to the production of action. Agential activity is a
genus whose species are [the phenomena just mentioned].^.10
There seems to be something he is onto, however, even if not all authors he mentions
are discussing the same thing.11 There certainly seems to be something special that we
at times can contribute to an action, by steering it in the right way, to make it a
paradigmatic action. BControl^ is an apt word for that, because it is emphasizes that it is
through the property characterized here that agents steer their actions by contributing
something to them.
There are two reasons in particular to think that Katsafanas must account for a strong
form of control that does not action be steered by features external to the agent. First, as
just mentioned, it seems that whatever the agent’s contribution to an action is, the agent
does not contribute to the success of the action if it succeeds in virtue factors that the
agent does not control (in a very ordinary sense of Bcontrol^). Second, Katsafanas listed
many forms of control as species of the genus which is activity, so accounting for the
intuitions underlying these are desiderata for a full account of Activity (or, as it were,
Control, in a broad sense of that word).12
To be fully active, then, whatever else a full account of Activity or Control contains,
agents must at least control their actions both when deciding what to do and when
enacting that decision, for these are different places where their contributions could be
interrupted. And, among other things, paradigmatic cases of loss of this kind of control
stem from various kinds of desires overwhelming the agent, or the intervention of
external circumstances that makes agents lose direction. In both cases, the agent
contributes less to the outcome than otherwise.
Katsafanas then goes on to deny an account of this phenomenon which he ascribes
to Kant and Locke, according to which reflection on one’s motives for acting involves,
at least, suspending the influence of these motives on the action one is about to perform,
so that the motives can incline without necessitating the action to be performed.13 I will
8 See ibid.
9 See ibid. His italics.
10 See ibid., pp. 113–114. My brackets.
11 See ibid., pp. 111–115.
12 Many authors (e.g. Fischer and Ravizza (1998)) have tried to work out the sense of control needed to be
responsible for actions. But it is a substantive question if this kind of control is the same kind of control that is
often (implicitly) taken to be partially constitutive of action. Perhaps it is sub-notion of the more general
notion. Moreover, control in general does not seem to be the same thing as self-control (cf. Henden 2008).
Others have noticed the same gap in the literature on control-in-general, however, and accounts are emerging:
cf. e.g. Shepherd (2014). I thank an anonymous referee for this journal for forcing me to be clearer here.
13 BMotives^ is Katsafanas’ term. The reader is free to substitute the term for drives, desires, besires, beliefs, or
other motivational states.
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not discuss his criticism of this view further, however; instead, I will go on to criticize
Katsafanas’ own positive suggestion. Expanding on the brief characterization of
Activity above, Katsafanas’ account looks as follows14:
(Activity) All actions manifest some degree of Activity, and more Activity the more
it is in (Equilibrium) and not (Disequilibrium), where
(Equilibrium) means that: BThe agent A’s and approves of her A-ing. Further
knowledge of the motives that figure in A’s etiology would not undermine her
approval of A-ing^ and
(Disequilibrium) means that: BThe agent A’s and currently approves of her A-ing.
However, if she knew more about the motives that figure in A’s etiology, she
would no longer approve of her A-ing.^15
From now and on, italicized Activity refers to Katsafanas’ view. But when I write
Activity without italicization, I use the term in general. The question, then, is how good
Activity is as an account of Activity or Control.
There are three reasons to think that it is not very good. Two are counterexamples.
Out of these, first, Activity does not seem to capture a kind of luck that I call
BReparatory Luck.^ Generally, by Reparatory Luck, I mean the luck involved in
situations where an agent Ag tries to perform an action A and the aim Ai of A would
not have been reached by Ag’s efforts, but Ai still ends up being reached due to the
intervention of arbitrary external circumstances.16 For example, a mugger (Ag) attempts
to shoot a man in the head (A). He misses, but the shot ricochets and hits the man (Ai).
17
Activity should capture this kind of luck because it seems that Ag is inactive, or not in
control of, reaching Ai when Reparatory Luck is present. Ag would have failed to reach
his aim had the external world not luckily cooperated.
But what does Activity imply with respect to Reparatory Luck? Consider the case
above. Shooing and missing, but then hitting due to a ricochet, seems compatible with
keeping on approving of the action in light of further knowledge about the etiology of
one’s action. For the mugger still hits his original aim, after all. Therefore, the shot was
active according to Activity, so he can remain in Equilibrium. But what has happened is
an instance of Reparatory Luck. And saying that such actions are active or controlled,
in the sense according to which active or controlled actions are steered or authored by
the agent rather than by external circumstances, certainly seems too inclusive. It is a
lucky external circumstance that makes the shot ricochet.
The second problem with Activity is that it seems possible to remain largely passive
or uncontrolled while still being in Equilibrium. Suppose an agent A is a detached
observer18 of all internal thoughts, feelings, desires and so on. A can be described as
being alienated from them, experiencing being in the grip of these mental states. But A
14 In virtue of the lack of iffs, however, I refrain from reading this as a biconditional definition.
15 See AFE, p. 138 for the citations.
16 Different ways of spelling out these circumstances may well yield different kinds of Reparatory Luck. I
ignore this complication in the article.
17 Obviously, this kind of luck lies behind many standard cases of deviant causation.
18 Cf. Strawson (1986) for a similar character in the context of discussions about free will.
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does not experience actively engaging with feelings and thoughts; the mental activities
just seem to happen inside the agent. It seems possible to do so while remaining active
according to Katsafanas’ proposed view, for gaining more knowledge could also be
passively achieved in this manner, and one could continue to approve of one’s action
throughout the entire episode. So the detached observer would do everything right
according to Activity.
But, intuitively, there is a kind of Activity or Control involved in engagement that
this agent lacks. With different motives, Awould have done something else instead, but
not in virtue of thinking that this other thing was better, more reasonable, rational, or
whatever, but just because of these different motives. If so, the agent does not seem to
be active or control his actions in the sense Katsafanas attempts to capture, for here it is
whichever arbitrary desires the agent has that activate or – indeed – control A.19
My diagnosis is that Activity is too minimal a criterion to capture all the relevant
aspects Activity or Control. It includes too much. And, importantly, it would not help to
just amend it by adding the anti-luck clause to solve the first problem, and an anti-
passivity clause to solve the second. The fact that it suffers from both of these problems
shows that it would be ad hoc. A deeper amendment is needed.
I leave it open how that amendment would look, however, for there is no obvious
consensus about what is a proper view here.20 If it is open which one is right, however,
it is unclear which it is that one should accept. So until a version is systematically
defended, or at least until we can be secure that we know some features that will
be part of a comprehensive account, it is unclear which normative implications
Activity has. Hence, drawing important consequences from it seems far too early.
So it seems implausible to think that one of the aims of action is Activity in Katsafanas’
sense.
Moreover, there is a third main problem with Activity, though it differs from the
ones above insofar as it is not a problem with its content, but with its interplay
with Power. Katsafanas needs a version of this aim with the same structural
features as his view, according to which an action is approved of or not in virtue
of deeper values (that, in turn, can be assessed by Power). For if it does not look
like this, he cannot combine it with Power to generate the kind of normative claims that
he defends.
But all views with this structure seem to put the cart before the horse. Approval in
the light of values, in an ordinary sense of what a Bvalue^ is, can be paradigmatically
uncontrolled. The values in question could be manipulated by someone else, dispro-
portionate emphasis might be placed on some values over others, and so on and so
forth. Such values are instilled by others (e.g. manipulative politicians or clergy), or by
the agent’s own errors (e.g. when the agent fails to judge which matters the most),
without the agent noticing the errors or, alternatively, even retaining the values by
wishful thinking or similar when shown that they are wrong. Such values can hardly be
said to be active or under the agent’s control, and accordingly assessments in their light
cannot be controlled either.
19 So, strictly speaking, it may even be wrong to call this person an ^agent^ in a technical sense of the word.
20 Is this unfair to a writer such as Shepherd, op. cit., who has recently presented an account in terms of
reliable causation over counterfactual situation? His account is not unproblematic either. For example, it
suffers from the problem of passivity that Katsafanas also suffers from.
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Katsafanas might deny that values are so uncontrolled, however. On the face of it, he
might then reply that the relevant values are (to be) assessed by Power. But he cannot
help himself to this deeper standard. Power is not, as I shall argue in the next section, a
constitutive aim of action.
But even if it were, it would not be helpful – it seems extensionally inadequate to
ground an account of what it means to be active or to control an action. This is because
it generates a standard of success where one succeeds if one overcomes various forms
of resistance. Katsafanas argues that it could be violated directly or indirectly, so that
one either aims to overcome resistance to an insignificant extent, or acts in ways (or has
values) that disallow one to do so further in the future.
But then, take one of Katsafanas’ Nietzsche-inspired examples of someone who has
values that lead them to violate this standard: Religious ascetics. Assuming they are
successful ascetics, they certainly seem to be in great control of themselves. 21
Katsafanas should think that they are not, however, because they are Bactive^ in virtue
of values that cannot be sustained in virtue of Power. Such values cannot be subsumed
under Activity, however, for they fundamentally clash with Power and must therefore be
rejected on reflection. So ascetics are under the spell of an ideology that cannot be
rationally upheld on his view, and hence do not count as exercising Activity. But this is
awkward. Potentially misguided control is still control, so there is no sense in which
they are not active or controlling in their actions.
Or is it? The background ideology itself can be assessed by Power. There can
be multiple levels of activity, one in specific actions, and one of background
ideology, for example.22 Accordingly, Katsafanas could say that religious ascetics
are not being active on some level, for they have underlying values that, by
themselves, are inactive. So they do not count as active. But surely their actions
can count as active or controlled in this particular case, even if not all of their
motives are. It seems too strong to demand that Activity should have to assess
motives all the way down, as it were, for that, too, seems extensionally inadequate.
Very often, that seems unnecessary – little assessment seems needed if I value drinking a
glass of water when I am thirsty, for example.
(III)
I just argued that Katsafanas most likely is wrong about Activity, but I did not deny that
it could be an aim of action. Katsafanas’ second agential aim – Power – does not seem
to be such an aim, however. 23 In this section, I try to clarify what Power is, and,
somewhat unspectacularly, argue that the drive psychology which Katsafanas uses to
argue that Power is an aim of action is false.
To make these points, I first need some terminology. Katsafanas does not spell
out what power means in as detailed a manner as he defines Constitutive Aim,
Success, Equilibrium or Disequilibrium, but he is clear that he is not talking about
21 See AFE, p. 195.
22 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
23 Various reviewers of AFE has noticed that this view of Katsafanas’ seems problematic; see Ferrero (2015)
and Poellner (2015). But none have developed the argument at length like I do.
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everyday (or social scientific) dominance-based takes on what power is. A charac-
terization as good as any for present purposes is:
(Power) An agent A has Power (to some degree) over an object O if A intention-
ally overcomes a resisting object O, where
(i) Bobject^ specifies the aim of the act of overcoming, whatever it is, that
provides resistance for the completion of the action, and
(ii) Bintentionally overcomes^ means that A intentionally succeeds in understand-
ing, using, or becomes able to use O (to some degree).
For example, A overcomes, and therefore has Power over, the aim of playing the
guitar (O) if A learns how to play the guitar. And A can master playing the guitar to
various degrees. According to Katsafanas, Nietzsche’s will to power is to be understood
as the activity of overcoming resistances in this way: B[T]o will power is [to perpetually]
seek to encounter and overcome resistance in the pursuit of some end.^24 And willing
Power in this sense, Katsafanas thinks, is present in every token of action.25
Of course, such a position needs defense. The argument for saying that Power is an
agential aim is based on a Nietzschean drive psychology. Katsafanas tries to reconstruct
Nietzsche’s view, and also defend it with some an argument from the nature of
satisfaction. Like Katsafanas himself, I am primarily concerned with his positive case
rather than his attempt at Nietzschean exegesis (though I return to these issues in more
detail towards the end of this section). The argument for the constitutive drive psy-
chology, then, goes like this:
First, drives are motivational states that aim at their own expression, and take
various objects merely as chance occasions for expressions. Second, drive-
motivated actions constitutively aim at encountering and overcoming resistance.
Third, all human actions are drive-motivated. It follows that all human actions
inescapably aim at encountering and overcoming resistance. (…) [A]ll human
action manifests will to power. Power is a constitutive aim of action.26
Some clarifying comments are needed before I start discussing the argument. What
is a drive? They have four features, Katsafanas thinks. They are (i) dispositions
generating affective orientations, (ii) for drives, one must distinguish between their
aims and their objects, (iii) they make agents disposed to seek out their aims, not their
objects (as desires would), and (iv) drives are constant.27
More specifically, (i) says that drives induce representations of the world to be
affectively charged. For example, food looks more appealing for a hungry agent.
Furthermore, (ii) says that they are such that their aims can be achieved by different
objects. Different kinds of food can satisfy hunger. Moreover, (iii) drives aim not at
24 See ibid., p. 159.
25 I follow Katsafanas in leaving the concept of Bwilling^ unspecified.
26 AFE, p. 165.
27 Katsafanas (2015). Moreover, the affective orientations can also be understood as evaluative.
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their objects but at their own expression. To continue the food example, an agent seeks
a meal (object) to eat to satisfy his hunger (aim), not the meal for its own sake when
driven by hunger. And (iv) the drive to eat is constant, even though it can be
temporarily satisfied. But it will recur, so a temporarily full agent will presumably seek
out food to eat again in the future.
Drives aim at overcoming resistance because they are aim-oriented rather than
object-oriented (cf. (iii)). Aiming at their expression then means that they are directed
towards being continuously acted upon over time, not just fulfilled at a single temporal
instance, in the way, Katsafanas thinks, a desire might be. It follows that actions that, in
Katsafanas’ terminology, are motivated by drives are process-directed, not goal-
directed (as they would have been if they were motivated by ordinary desires).
Process-directed actions aim not at their own satisfaction, but at continuously
succeeding at understanding, using or becoming able to use their aim. Therefore, they
aim at Power. For example, presumably, the action of eating is a way in which the drive
may reproduce itself by allowing the agent possessing it to become hungry again. And
as it is part of the structure of the drive’s aim to find new objects to overcome, insofar as
the agent engages in process-directed action, she aims at continuously overcoming
resistance. Katsafanas thinks that all actions are process-directed like this.
Is this argument defensible? I leave the first and second premises for now. As
Katsafanas is aware, one does wonder if the third premise is right, however. Do all
actions have such a drive-like structure? Take the action of writing this paper. Is there
really a drive which can take academic writing as its object? Is it not better interpreted
as motivated by a desire (or whatever someone with a non-Humean psychology might
posit to explain it)? Of course, this is not to say that there is nothing drive-like out there.
Desires to eat, for example, are surely not generated purely by Pavlovian conditioning –
at times we are, perhaps, disposed to desire what makes us maintain our functions. But
that is still very different from Katsafanas-style drives; for example, such drives do not
require an aim/object distinction. So why are Katsafanas’ drives needed?
One can formulate this potential problem for the third premise as a dilemma. Either
all actions stem from drives, or they do not. If they do, the conclusion of the argument
is vindicated; all actions aim at Power. But if not, then not all actions aim at Power. If
so, according to Constitutive Aim, where Beach token of A aims at G^, not all actions
aim at overcoming resistance. So either all actions stem from drives, or Power is not a
constitutive aim of action.
Katsafanas attempts to defend the first horn. He offers some positive arguments, but
also spends some time replying to criticisms of the third premise. I focus on his attempts
to ward off two kinds of counterexamples, though I return to the positive arguments
towards the end. Katsafanas uses two strategies to attempt to ward off the first kind of
counterexamples, such as the drive-to-academic-writing above. I argue that they both fail.
An underlying problem when he discusses both kinds of counterexamples is that
drives seem to be an unnecessary theoretical construct. Many writers – including
Katsafanas – admit that desires (at least sometimes) provide a motivational force that
brings about actions. And writers that do not tend to admit that something else than
drives do. Accordingly, adding drives to agents’ motivational structures adds an extra
dimension to action explanation. It is both an uncontroversial starting point that
they are not needed (in his sense), and unparsimonious to add them to one’s
explanations. So if we can interpret the cases without adding drives, we are better off.
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So that is what I am going to try to do. Katsafanas does not see how deep this problem
goes, however, and takes them on as straight counterexamples.28
To start off, then, Katsafanas’ strategy with respect to the first kind of counterexample
is to try to show how actions that seemingly do not involve drives in fact do. And that
may well be plausible, but it will be enough to show that there is no need to invoke
drives to explain them to be better off. He takes on a case where an agent moves a pen
across a page when writing. How do these movements aim at overcoming resistance?
Katsafanas suggests that such cases can be explained by claiming that they are parts of
larger actions. The agent does not move the pen across the page for the sake of doing so,
but for the sake of writing a text. And writing a text, in turn, is usually instrumental to yet
another ulterior end too. Or, more generally:
(Larger) An action, A-ing, is a part of a larger action, B-ing, iff A-ing and B-ing
have a common causal history.29
In virtue of Larger, minor actions can be re-described as parts of greater ones that
more plausibly might be taken to aim at resistance. Katsafanas defends it with two
considerations. First, he follows Nietzsche in thinking that drives generate desires, so
desires stem from drives. If desires are causally generated by drives, and Larger is true,
then desire-directed actions are part of drive-directed ones. Second, Katsafanas invokes
the aim/object-distinction from (ii); drives can manifest themselves in several different
actions, so several actions can be causally traced back to the same drive. The causal
history of an action displays its ultimate ground in a drive.
It should be uncontroversial that Larger – or something like it – explains an important
feature of many actions insofar as they are means to achieve greater ends. However, this
does not imply that drives lie behind every action. Actions might just as well be traced
back to desires (or what non-Humeans think does the same work) in virtue of such a
principle. Hence, the first point Katsafanas makes to defend Larger is unimpressive.
The second point fails too. That drives might generate many kinds of action does not
imply that desires could not generate some actions. Katsafanas seems content to rely on
postulating the thesis that drives generate all desires, not just some of them. This would
means that all desires depend on drives in some interesting sense – presumably a causal
sense, to make the argument go through without further tweaking. He does not present
an argument for why all desire would do so, however. But why should we not think of
some desires, and then the actions stemming from them – e.g. my desire watch
Tottenham Hotspur play football – as purely dependent on ecological circumstances,
plus some disposition to generate desires? Or why are they not just desires depending
not on external but internal circumstances? For example, why is not a desire to
contemplate the eternal ideas, stemming from the mere fact that I have the concepts
of what Aristotle took to be the eternal ideas, generated just by me possessing those
concepts, plus some disposition to generate desires (and, arguably, some romanticizing
of philosophy)?
To be sure, it is possible to come up with some way that these desires or actions
depend on drives, just as it is often possible to interpret the same empirical findings in
28 I thank an anonymous referee for making me develop this point.
29 AFE, p. 180.
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many theoretical frameworks in other cases. But in the light of the reasons to favour
desire-based explanations (or similar) to drive-based ones above, and absent an argu-
ment for Katsafanas’ thesis that all desires depend on drives, it seems strained to force
desires into his framework. So there is no reason to believe that all actions are so large
that they need to be squeezed into a drive-oriented framework by Larger.
Katsafanas attempts to discuss a second kind of cases as well. Here, agents do not seem
to aim at resistance, either because resistance plays no role in these cases, or because
agents seem to try to minimize it. He tries to re-describe them as cases where the agents do
aim at some minimal kind of resistance. And then he does the same thing for cases where
agents in fact seem to aim to minimize resistance. His examples are a casual chat with a
friend or watching a sitcom on TV.And surely, it is indeed rare that one attempts to watch a
sitcom while maximizing the contrast on the screen to make it harder to look at.
Again, Katsafanas presents two possible replies to what happens in these cases.
First, he argues that the resistance sought is related to the action. For example, in a
casual conversation, there is simply little resistance to overcome. Second, even when
there appears to be little in the way of resistance around, there is some. For example,
attending to the TV show offers at least one kind of minimal resistance.
The first reply seems alright so far as it goes. Some actions – including those in the
examples – clearly seem to involve very little in the way of resistance, in contrast with actions
constituting more difficult ventures, such as writing a symphony or completing grad school.
However, this explanation does not go very far. In reply to both of the replies, one
might ask if the best explanation of what the agents do is to seek minimal resistance, or
if such cases really show that it is best to explain the kinds of resistance faced as just
being in the way of completing the action. On the face of it, it seems contrived to claim
that actions where agents encounter little resistance in fact aim at that resistance. Rather,
when having a casual chat with a friend or (especially) when watching TV, any kind of
resistance seems to be at best an annoying distraction. The aim seems simply to say
what one has to say, or to be engulfed in the story.
This reinterpretation of the cases is reinforced by a second point. There are obvi-
ously various kinds of resistance present for various forces in non-action events as well.
A shelf holds a book above the floor. All kinds of forces are in the way of all kinds of
events. So there is no obvious reason for saying that Katsafanas’ resistance in fact is
part of the structure of such actions, rather than just being in the way. So the second
strategy seems implausible too.
Accordingly, neither defensive strategy work to defend Katsafanas’ claim that all
actions aim at resistance. There is, however, a general objection against my criticism of
Katsafanas’ defense of the first horn in the dilemma. This objection is that I might have
been unfair by discussing potential implications of his view rather than the arguments in
its favour. For if there is independent support for thinking that all actions stem from drives,
the putative counter-examples might be uninteresting. It is still an established theory.30
I do not think the view has enough support to warrant this judgement, however.
Katsafanas presents two styles of argument in favour of his main conclusion. The first
30 An anonymous reviewer has pressed this reply against my take on the second batch of counterexamples,
arguing that Katsafanas has already established his view, and therefore only needs to show that the cases he
discusses are compatible with it, not best explained by it. But I now argue that Katsafanas has failed to
establish that his view is strong enough for this strategy.
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kind of arguments is quasi-exegetical, insofar as the arguments reach back to
Nietzsche’s own arguments in favour of the view that action does not aim at achieving
specific aims but at continuous satisfaction. It is not clear if Katsafanas fully endorses
rather than just mentions the Nietzschean lines of thought. Nevertheless, he mentions
the idea that seemingly non-drive-guided actions can be reinterpreted as drive-guided
actions, and the thought that some of our most lastingly satisfying actions seem to stem
from drives insofar as they aim to overcome resistance. Here Katsafanas’ example is
creativity: With Nietzsche, he thinks that creative individuals do not aim at producing
works of art, but at the process of creative activity.31
I run these two lines of thought together in a way that Katsafanas does not, however,
for the reason that they seem to succumb to the same counterargument – the fact that
these phenomena can be interpreted as stemming from drives is no reason to believe
that the interpretation are apt. All phenomena can be described in many ways, and we
need reason to believe that some descriptions are better than others. For that we need
independent arguments. If there are arguments worth pursuing in Nietzsche’s writings
on these issues, Katsafanas has not presented them in AFE.
More interestingly, secondly, Katsafanas appeals to some empirical evidence about
the nature of satisfaction to support the view that we act based on drives rather than
desires. There is some evidence, he thinks, for the view that Bhuman beings are most
satisfied when engaged in activities that provide them with challenges that are neither
too easy nor beyond their capacities.^32 And that is supposed to support the view that
engaging in some processes (i.e. by process-directed actions) provides lasting satisfac-
tion at least during the time one engages in them, as opposed to achieving ends (i.e. by
goal-directed actions), which he thinks never leads to lasting satisfaction. Therefore, the
evidence also supports the view that actions aim at Power.
However, first, even Katsafanas just seems to take the findings to be evidence
for the weaker claim that there are some processes that provide satisfaction, not
that all actions work in this way. Hence, he has no argument against the view that
some (other) actions do not lead to lasting satisfaction. Moreover, second, it is
unclear if this empirical point cannot be handled by saying that the processes do
not aim at reaching lasting satisfaction, but rather the satisfaction of some hard-to-
satisfy desires. So Katsafanas’ positive case for drives does not establish that all
actions stem from them; in fact, it is still not clear that he has established that any
actions stem from drives.33
Summing up, I have argued against the Larger-based case for interpreting actions as
drive-based that it seems compatible with treating desire-satisfaction as the aim of
(some) actions. And I have argued against Katsafanas’ second batch of counterexam-
ples, according to which one (often) seeks to minimize resistance, that where he thinks
there are few kinds or minimal degrees of resistance, these are better interpreted as just
being in the way of the aim of the action than aimed at. Desires which are not generated
by drives seem to be at work in explaining at least some actions, and at times actions do
not seem to aim at resistance and its overcoming but to minimize it. Hence, not all
actions appear to be motivated by drives. So Power is not a constitutive aim of action.
31 AFE, p. 171–174.
32 See ibid., p. 174.
33 See Ferrero (2015) for similar considerations.
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(IV)
My case so far has been negative. But in this section, I aim to spell out how a Humean
approach to constitutivism can look. I also explain how it can respond to all of
Katsafanas’ desiderata for what a good form of constitutivism should do as well as
solve the problems for his theory presented in the last two sections. Accordingly, if one
is impressed with Katsafanas’ arguments, then one should prefer the Humean alterna-
tive. However, this does not mean that I take the Humean alternative as I present it to be
the best theory all-things-considered just in virtue of the arguments presented here.
Instead, I mainly aim to show that it is better than at least Katsafanas’ view, and because
it has some support in virtue of its problem-solving abilities, constitutivists ought to
take it seriously and develop it fully. Doing so, however, is a task for another occasion.
How does the view look? There seems to be a number of views in the literature going
under the same name. I do not mean to be speaking about the kind of Humean
constitutivism – associated with Jamie Dreier – that Katsafanas discusses early in AFE.
This view just says that a minimal norm of instrumental rationality is partially constitu-
tive of action. Nor will I discuss the constructivist view proposed by Sharon Street that
Katsafanas calls a Humean version of constitutivism.34 On this view, agents evaluate their
reasons in terms of their other reasons from a distinctly practical point of view.
Rather, the kind of Humean constitutivism I have in mind is more closely related to,
though not identical with, the kind recently defended by Michael Smith. It has three main
features. First, it assumes at least a (broadly) Humean belief-desire framework for explaining
the constitution of action, where the presence of a belief and a desire, suitably related, is a
necessary condition for construing an event as an action. They are just necessary, however;
other potential features of action explanation are intentions and, importantly, rational
principles – or dispositions – linking the previously mentioned states together.
Moreover, two other aspects of Smith’s 1990s apparatus also feature in this account.
35 These are, first, the view that reasons depend on what an ideally rational counterpart
would do (or desire), giving us a kind of reasons internalism, and, second, rationalist
internalism about normative motivation, according to which, roughly, an agent gains a
desire to φ if she judges that she ought to φ and she is rational. One needs not commit
oneself to the details of Smith’s view here, however. For example, it does not really
matter if the ideal counterpart is an exemplar or an advisor, 36 or whether or not
rationalist internalism is a conceptual or metaphysical claim.
The kind of reasons internalism involved in this constitutivist picture is importantly
qualified, however. For one can argue, generalizing from Smith’s recent arguments,37 that
it is somehow constitutive of the ideally rational counterpart to have certain specific,
dominant desires. A dominant desire is a desire that dominates all others of the ideally
rational agent. If these desires have content which is even remotely moral, and the
dominant desires of an ideally rational agent (whichever they are) constitute our dominant
reasons, then we suddenly seem to have dominant reasons which also are moral reasons.
34 See e.g. Street (2012), discussed in Katsfaanas (fc.).
35 For example, Scanlon (2014), ch. 1, criticizes such takes on reasons, but Tubert (2015) defends
something like it.
36 For discussion, see e.g. Smith (2004 [1997]) and Tubert, op. cit.
37 Smith (2011, 2012).
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One version of this strategy has been proposed by Smith. He has argued that, to
remain ideal or ideally rational (I use the term synonymously below), when using her
rational capacities, an ideally rational agent needs a certain set of desires to aid and not
interfere with her present rational deliberation that can make her rely on herself as well
as be vigilant to the risks involved in losing control. These desires also dominate all
other desires, and, importantly, they generalize, Smith argues, to aiding in the exercise
of, and not interfering with, others’ rational abilities.38 Adding his reasons internalism
to this view, the ideal agent’s desires become our reasons.
I personally prefer another version of this view where the dominant desires of the ideal
agent are directly rationally required because they are required by some requirement of
rationality. Assuming the ideal agent makes this judgement – which surely she does, ex
hypothesi – then by rationalist internalism about motivation, she also attains the desire. And
then, by reasons internalism,we attain the reason.Whether or not there is such a requirement
of rationality is another question, however, but the framework is just another instance of the
general strategy, so which version is the best does not matter for present purposes.
It does matter, however, if these views are interpreted as coherentist or
foundationalist constitutivisms, where the former views spell out the content of ratio-
nality (that constitutes the ideal agents) and morality at the same time in reflective
equilibrium, and the latter try argue for moral principles from some general principles
that are independent of moral intuitions in reflective equilibrium. Smith’s view has been
associated with the coherentist approach, 39 but in fact his argument can be read
foundationalistically. I propose that this is a stronger interpretation of the view (whether
or not it is Smith’s intended one), in part because it does not expose the view to
ordinary problems associated with reflective equilibrium, and in part because it can
help solving one of Katsafanas’ problems (as I shall argue).
Here, Katsafanas’ view is supposed to make sense of several desiderata for a
plausible explanation of practical normativity. These are also classic problems for many
traditional metaethical theories, so the fact that it can make sense of them is an
argument in its favour in general. First, there is an epistemic challenge. Katsafanas’
version is an argument from disagreement. Moral disagreement over time and space, he
thinks, is best explained by the preponderance of non-rational (sociological and
psychological) forces which do not track the truth. Therefore, we need justification
for retaining our moral beliefs. Second, there is a metaphysical challenge. Values are
queer, as Mackie famously argued, and, moreover, moral theories often rely on
implausible assumptions about human nature. And third, there is a practical challenge.
Why does morality have a motivational grip on us? Katsafanas thinks any systematic
metaethical (or, broader, metanormative) view ought to face these challenges.
He also adds two other points that his own view is supposed to make sense of. These
stem from his discussion of previous constitutivist proposals from David Velleman and
Christine Korsgaard. Allegedly contra Velleman, (a) any plausible constitutivist view
must depend on a constitutive feature which can be realized to different extents, which
Velleman’s does not. And contra Korsgaard, (b) a constitutivist view must be able to
rank the weight of different reasons in virtue of the normativity-constituting features of
their account, but she is only able to call actions legitimate or not, depending on
38 I cannot go deeper into the argument here, however, but see Leffler (2014) for discussion.
39 By Smith (2010), and also Katsafanas (2016).
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whether or not they are acceptable by the tests supplied by the categorical imperative.40
So she is unable to rank the strengths of all those maxims that pass the tests.
Accounting for these desiderata is the core of Katsafanas’ case for a Nietzschean
version of constitutivism.41 Hence, if the Humean view can account for them as well as
solve the problems that his own view faces, it is better off than his view.
Starting with his three classic sceptical arguments, Katsafanas himself notes that a
Humean metaethics presumably can deal with the metaphysical and practical challenges.
42 With respect to the metaphysical challenge of queer properties, the Humean view is
naturalistic enough, although it needs not take any stance on exactly which metaphysics are
needed. But no non-natural properties (or relations) are needed either way according to
Humeans. Moreover, with respect to the practical challenge, viz. the challenge of explaining
how normative judgements can get a grip on agents, rationalist internalism guarantees that
an agent has the desires of the ideally rational agent if she is rational herself. But rationalist
internalism is part of the view that I proposed. So that problem, too, is solved.
However, Katsafanas is more doubtful about the way in which the Humean view can
solve the epistemic challenge, viz. how it can escape running into the problem of explaining
how non-rational factors have explained our disagreeing judgements over time and space.
Here, the foundationalist structure of the proposed Humean view can solve the problem.
Arguably, a coherentist form of Humeanism might not be able to do this job very well – it
might end up inheriting the ordinary problems with, e.g., biased intuitions and beliefs in
reflective equilibrium, or even require relativism if all potential equilibria are supposed to be
equally acceptable. But if a foundationalist argument that does not rely onmoral intuitions is
given, then what does the epistemic challenge really amount to? An argument for moral
reasons can be provided without relying on the moral views that Katsafanas thinks there is
problematic disagreement about. That is, for example, what Smith seems to try to do (on one
reading of his views), but there might be other arguments than his available too. Of course,
this reply to the epistemic challenge is only as strong as the foundationalist arguments. If
they fail, then there is no Humean argument here. But that is not problem insofar as they are
successful, so there is a strategy to solve the epistemic problem.
What of the other desiderata, then? Katsafanas’ new desiderata, and the problems
for his own account? The desiderata were (a) that the constitutive feature must be
possible to realize to different extents, and (b) that a proper constitutivist view must
show how one can rank the weights of different reasons. A Humean can do both. The
response to (a) is obvious: An agent can obviously be more or less ideal in many
different ways. Here, the most important is probably the way in which she may or may
not fail to grasp the reasons stemming from the ideal agent to different extents. So
actions can be reason-guided to different extents. And the response to (b) is that as the
desires of an ideally rational agent are our reasons, the strength of different desires
gives rise to reasons of differing strengths.43 And these can be ranked.
Finally, this view can solve the problems for Katsafanas’ view. Regarding the denial of
Activity as a good account of Activity in section (II), Humeans need not rely on controversial
assumptions about activity or control at all. Hence, the problems for Katsafanas-style views
40 See AFE., ch. 3 & 4; p. 109.
41 At least in Katsafanas (2013). It may be that he takes on other motivations later – cf. Katsafanas (2016). But
the most important arguments there are also addressed here.
42 See AFE, pp. 32–35.
43 Notably, however, apart from the dominant ones, these may be agent-relative. But that is irrelevant here.
Philosophia
do not matter here. And regarding the problems for Power in section (III), the Humean
theory of action of course does not need to rely on drives, or even theses like Larger, as they
famously rely on beliefs and desires when explaining action. Therefore, summarizing, the
Humean view can make sense of all the points that the Nietzschean one was supposed to
make sense of, and is unaffected by my challenges to Katsafanas’ view.
(V)
In section (II), I argued that Katsafanas is wrong about the nature of Activity. Activity
seems obviously false as it cannot capture Reparatory Luck and is compatible with a
kind of passivity, and assessment of action in terms of values does not seem to be the
right way to generate actions. In section (III), I argued that Power not is a constitutive
aim of action. Not all actions are drive-guided, and the best explanations of the putative
counterexamples to Katsafanas’ view stand in tension with his view. Finally, in section
(IV), I sketched a Humean alternative to Katsafanas’ view. I argued that it can solve the
problems for Katsafanas’ view, as well as respond to his desiderata more broadly.
I think this shows that some version of the Humean view is better than Katsafanas’,
and indeed can make sense of Katsafanas’ original desiderata, which may well be
interpreted as an argument in its favour by itself. This says does not say that it is
ultimately correct. But it ought to be taken seriously and be investigated further.
However, doing so is beyond the scope of this paper.44
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